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ARE WE TURNING JUDGES
INTO POLITICIANS?
James Michael Scheppele*
People value the notion of an independent judiciary,' but they
also think that the judiciary should be held accountable for its
decisions.2  At one end of the spectrum, too much emphasis on
independence creates a risk that judges will usurp power from the
legislative and executive branches. However, as is discussed below,
too much emphasis on accountability creates a risk that judges will
not be adequately impartial. This Article questions how independent
our judiciary really is, discusses some of the mechanisms limiting
that independence, and considers the risk that too much
accountability may reduce impartiality to undesirable levels. The
discussion centers primarily on state-level courts, where
independence currently occupies an inferior position on the
independence / accountability scale, but also touches on some issues
that courts face at the federal level.
I. INDEPENDENT YET ACCOUNTABLE
There are two primary arguments for the importance of an
independent judiciary. First, an independent judiciary is better able
* J.D. Candidate, May 2006, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. B.A.,
University of California at Santa Barbara. My thanks to all who helped create
and refine this Article. Special thanks to my family for their constant love and
encouragement through all of my meandering endeavors.
1. See Am. Bar Ass'n, Speech Ideas/Talking Points: Independence of the
Judiciary, (2002) [hereinafter ABA Survey] ("[N]early three-fourths of
Americans are concerned that the impartiality of judges is compromised by
their need to raise campaign money."), at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/
lawday/talking/judicialelections.html.
2. See id. ("[C]itizens think judges are not being held accountable.
Judicial discipline systems are criticized as ineffectual, and judges face
increasing pressure to conform their decisions to serve the interests of
particular constituencies.").
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to make impartial decisions based on the merits of individual cases.
Second, the judicial branch was designed to be a separate, third
branch of government, as part of the checks and balances central to
our form of government. A strong example of this is Brown v. Board
of Education,3 a politically unpopular decision at the time it was
made, in which the Supreme Court declared the doctrine of "separate
but equal" unconstitutional in the educational setting.
It is also important, however, that judges retain some sort of
accountability. A total lack of accountability poses the risk that
courts will become "super legislatures," upsetting the balance of
power between themselves and the other two branches of
government. Some people might articulate this idea with the term
"activist judges." A completely unaccountable judiciary is as
undesirable as a judiciary that is not independent.
II. Do WE REALLY HAVE AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY
ABLE TO OPERATE IMPARTIALLY?
The judiciary arguably has very limited independence. A
judiciary that is not self-sustaining may need to form alliances to
operate effectively. This need to form alliances may in turn reduce
its ability to achieve the ideal level of impartiality and raise
accountability to undesirable levels. In addition to alliances, the
following are mechanisms that may prevent the judiciary from
achieving full independence and impartiality.
A. Laws
Legislatures, at both the federal and state levels, can pass laws
that limit the ability of the court to decide matters that otherwise
would be within the scope of judicial activity. These laws may be
punitive, passed as punishment for doing something that the
legislature did not like. These laws may also represent an attempt by
the legislature to impose its goals and biases on the judicial process,
where they do not belong. Below are examples of such laws.
The legislature can pass laws denying the courts jurisdiction to
hear certain matters. At the federal level, the House of
Representatives recently proposed the Pledge Protection Act of
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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2003, 4 which would stop the federal judiciary from hearing cases
regarding the constitutionality of the phrase "under God" in the
Pledge of Allegiance. 5 The constitutionality of laws in this country
has historically been a judicial question. 6 Thus, even if Congress
could technically limit the ability of federal courts to hear this type of
case, an attempt to do so impinges on power traditionally viewed as
belonging to the judiciary. This is not an isolated incident. In the
past two years, the House of Representatives has "passed six bills
limiting [the] jurisdiction [of the federal courts].
Also at the federal level, until recently, the legislature further
limited the discretion of the courts through federal sentencing
guidelines. 8 These guidelines limited the sentence a judge could
impose. Limiting available alternatives reduces a judge's ability to
recognize the need for mercy where justified. There was one notable
exception to the guidelines, called a downward departure. Under this
exception, a judge was allowed to impose a lesser sentence than
specified in the sentencing guidelines, but had to explain the reasons
for doing so. However, as discussed in section II(C) below, the
executive branch further sought to limit judicial independence by
monitoring, and thereby implicitly threatening to publicize, the use
of downward departures.
State courts are also often subject to determinate sentencing.
California's Three Strikes Law is another legislated limitation on
judicial independence. Under current law a person with two prior
violent felonies, subsequently convicted of any felony, must be
sentenced to a minimum of twenty-five years to life.9  This
4. H.R. 2028, 108 Cong., 1 Sess. (2003).
5. Id.
6. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
7. Special Report with Brit Hume: They Thumbed Their Nose
(Fox News Channel television broadcast, Mar. 30, 2005) (transcript at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,152179,00.html).
8. In United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), the Supreme Court
declared certain provisions of the guidelines unconstitutional, essentially
overruling their mandatory nature. Thus, even though the guidelines are not
currently in full effect, they serve as an example of ways a legislature may
attempt to limit the independence of the judiciary.
9. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(b), 667.5, 1192.7 (West 2004).
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sentencing scheme, like the federal sentencing guidelines, reduces a
judge's ability to impose a lesser sentence even if the facts seem to
warrant it.
10
B. The Budget
"As the Judiciary's workload continues to grow, the current
budget constraints are bound to affect the ability of the federal courts
efficiently and effectively to dispense justice."' 1 If the judiciary does
not receive sufficient funds to operate, can it really be an
independent third branch of government? There is no more efficient
means of controlling an entity than controlling its purse strings.
Thus, the legislative and executive branches can use budgets to
control the judicial branch. For instance, if the legislature were
inclined to punish the judiciary for some reason, would a retaliatory
cut in the budget of the judicial branch be a logical next step?
Budget cuts to the judiciary can also simply be an unintentional
consequence of something as benign, albeit unfortunate, as a
shortage of money. The judiciary is very vulnerable to budget cuts
in times of recession. Legislators who must preserve their popularity
with voters will be tempted to allocate scarce funds to the things that
affect the average person most directly and dramatically, such as law
enforcement, schools, and the health care system. 12 Average people
tend not to be aware of the degree to which the judicial system serves
their needs. Consequently, the judicial system cannot compete
effectively in a popularity contest that influences the allocation of
scarce resources.
A common legislative argument to accompany judicial budget
shortages is that the judiciary should lobby more effectively to obtain
10. Cf Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (sentencing a man who
stole three golf clubs to twenty-five years to life because of two prior violent
felony convictions).
11. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, 2004 Year-End Report on the
Federal Judiciary, 37 THIRD BRANCH 1 (2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/
jan05ttb/2004/index.html#crisis.
12. Audio Archive: Panel on the Independence of the Judiciary, Access
to Justice Symposium, Loyola of Los Angeles Law School, at 43:00
(Oct. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Independence Panel] (Wesson, panelist), at
http://events.lls.edu/cjp/schedule.html.
1520
Spring 2005] JUDGES TURNING INTO POLITICIANS?
its fair share of budget money. 13 This is an untenable solution for
two reasons. First, lobbying by the judiciary is unseemly. As both a
coequal branch of government and an impartial arbiter of disputes, it
would be inappropriate for the judiciary to solicit money. 14
Second, lobbying takes money. The state funds state courts.' 5
Many would find it inappropriate, not to mention inefficient, to use
state money to lobby the state. Legislators have suggested that
judges should do what teachers and the police do-contribute to the
lobbying efforts conducted on their behalf.16 This is impractical.
Teachers and policemen have an incentive to contribute to their
unions' lobbying efforts, as those efforts are often focused on salary
and benefit increases. 17 Judges do not have this same incentive
because the budget money they seek is not for salary increases, but
merely to pay the expenses needed to keep the courthouse doors
open.
Legislators also suggest that the courts might assure adequate
funding by forming lobbying partnerships with groups (such as
consumer attorneys or other groups sympathetic to the need for court
funding) who can assist in lobbying the legislature. 19  This
suggestion is also fraught with peril for judicial independence. What
happens when one of these groups becomes a litigant? Can members
of the judiciary who have relied upon this ally in their lobbying
efforts really be impartial when faced with concerns that they may be
left without a partner the next time they need to fight budget cuts?
Even if they can, what about the need for the appearance of
impartiality? Who would want to be the party on the other side of
such a case?
20
13. Id. at 42:30 (Wesson, panelist).
14. Id. at 51:30 (Taylor, J.).
15. The federal government, meanwhile, funds the federal courts.
16. Independence Panel, supra note 12, at 42:30 (Wesson, panelist).
17. E.g., Center for Governmental Research Inc., Did You Know ... Who
Influences State and Local Employee Pay and Benefits Policies?, at
http://www.cgr.org/ICSG/Articles/?id=14 (last visited Aug. 1, 2005);
David B. Caruso, Teachers Win Plan For Early Retirement, at
http://cltg.org/cltg/cltg2000/00-06-23.htm (June 23, 2000).
18. Independence Panel, supra note 12, at 53:00 (Miller, J.).
19. Id. at 46:00 (Wesson, panelist).
20. These concerns are also reflected in the context of elections.
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The reality is, however, that the judiciary is now faced with
some difficult choices. In 2004 the federal judiciary eliminated
1,350 "employees other than judges and the staff who work in their
chambers. ' 21 As a state-level example, the Los Angeles Superior
Court has suffered approximately $100 million in budget cuts
22over the last three years. Despite the inappropriateness and
inefficiencies of lobbying by the judiciary, judicial leaders today may
be compelled to lobby because of the threat that budget cuts will
prevent the judicial system from serving the public.
Under these circumstances, the danger is that judges may be
tempted to make decisions that will not offend legislators, the public,
or their lobbying allies in order to prevent the loss of funding that
may result from unpopular decisions.
C. Intimidation
Intimidation of judges may be used to reduce impartiality. At
the federal level, until United States v. Booker declared the
mandatory nature of the federal sentencing guidelines
unconstitutional, the use of downward departures was a useful tool
against a judge. In California, attorneys may strategically use a
"CCP 170.6 challenge" 23 to put pressure on a judge.
24
1. A Return to Downward Departure
As noted in Section II(A), the downward departure mechanism
allowed a federal judge to deviate from the federal sentencing
guidelines if the judge gave a reason for it. Recently, former
Attorney General John Ashcroft, and Congress, were "statistically
track[ing] ... those federal judges they believe[d] to be granting too
many downward departures."2 5  Using downward departures too
21. Rehnquist, supra note 11.
22. Independence Panel, supra note 12, at 1:25:00 (MacLauglin, J.).
23. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.6 (Deering 2004).
24. Although elections may also be used as a means of intimidation, they
bring up other issues as well. Thus, they are discussed in the next section.
25. Edward Lazarus, Ashcroft's New Charging, Plea Bargaining,
and Sentencing Policies, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/10/03/
findlaw.analysis.lazarus.ashcroft/index.html (Oct. 3, 2003). With the recent
decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), it remains to be seen
if the use of downward departures will be necessary anymore. Even if they
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often can give rise to the label of being "soft on crime." Knowing
that his or her downward departures were being tracked, a judge
might be less inclined to use them so that they would not haunt him
or her later.
The next logical question is: "So what?" Federal judges have
life terms. They are not going to lose their jobs over a "soft on
crime" label. This is great if a federal judge is planning to remain a
federal judge in the same court for life. But as a practical matter,
many judges aspire to other things. For example, a trial court judge
may hope to serve on an appellate court or in another position such
as United States Attorney, Attorney General or other high office. A
"soft on crime" label, while it would not cost them their jobs, might
cost federal judges these opportunities in other arenas. It is therefore
in the best interest of these judges to avoid such a label. Being only
human, it is logical to assume that judges contemplating downward
departures or other sentencing issues may have been tempted to
consider their self-interest as well as the equities in imposing
sentences. Thus, while downward departures may have appeared to
be a sufficient control on any undesirable inflexibility in the federal
sentencing guidelines, their use may in practice have been restricted
by judges who would have preferred to avoid the label of "soft on
crime."
2. CCP 170.6 Challenges
In California courts, each side in a case has one chance to
disqualify a particular judge without having to justify the
disqualification. To accomplish this, the party files an affidavit of
prejudice pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section
170.6, stating that the judge is prejudiced against that party.26 No
facts are required to prove this assertion.2 7  Consequently, the
exercise of the 170.6 challenge has the potential to limit judicial
independence in making impartial decisions.
The 170.6 challenge can be used to put pressure on a particular
judge. In the context of criminal practice, Assistant District
are, with the appointment of new Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez it is
unclear whether their use would continue to be tracked.
26. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.6(2) (Deering 2004).
27. Id. § 170.6(3) (Deering 2004).
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Attorneys and Deputy Public Defenders are present in the courts in
large enough numbers to comprise their own constituencies. If the
District Attorney's Office decides that a particular judge in a
criminal court is not "law and order" enough28 (perhaps the judge
does not impose the death penalty very often), the District Attorney's
office can intimidate that judge by filing a CCP 170.6 challenge in
every case that comes before that judge.2 9 This could cause the judge
to lose his or her value to the court because he or she will not hear
any cases. Since the judge will not be accomplishing the work of the
court, the court might eventually be forced to transfer the judge out
of a criminal assignment. This is a very serious problem for a
judge whose entire legal career has been spent in the criminal justice
system.
This can create a concern for judges "that if they make a
decision that is sufficiently offensive to one side or the other ... they
could in effect be taken out of their career." 3' Judges are only
human, and do not want to lose their jobs or be sent to undesired
assignments. In a best-case scenario, a judge will be able to look
past this concern and render an impartial decision. At worst, this
concern could mean that a judge will impose the death penalty
because he or she is intimidated by the District Attorney, rather than
because it is appropriate. Is this level of accountability really
desirable?
D. Elections
Judicial elections have become hotly contested battles. 32 There
are two major ways judicial elections adversely affect the
28. "Soft on Crime" would be another term for this.
29. Alternatively, the Public Defender's Office could impose a blanket
170.6 on a judge because he or she is too "Law and Order."
30. Independence Panel, supra note 12, at 20:30 (MacLauglin, J.). Note
that Judge William MacLaughlin, the Presiding Judge of the Los Angeles
Superior Court, stated at the symposium that courts generally avoid taking
such action, although it has happened. Id.
31. Id. at 51:30 (Taylor, J.).
32. Anthony Champagne, Tort Reform and Judicial Selection, 38 LOY. OF
L.A. L.REv. 1483 (2005).
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independence of the judiciary.33 Both make it difficult for a judge to
render impartial decisions. Both pose a risk to the checks and
balances inherent in a three-branch form of government.
First, as with downward departures and CCP 170.6 challenges,
elections can be used to intimidate judges. Fear of being defeated in
the next election or fear of a recall election may tempt a judge to
make decisions that will be popular at the ballot box.34 Second, with
elections comes the need to raise money. With the need to raise
money comes the need to establish relationships with contributors
who expect a quid pro quo. Thus, as with other mechanisms
designed to assure that judges are accountable, the need to stand for
election may reduce a judge's impartiality.
The good news about elections is that the public can boot an
incompetent judge out of office. But the question remains whether
the positive sides of removing a judge with relative ease are
outweighed by the negative impact on impartiality and
independence.
1. More Intimidation
Elections can be used to intimidate judges who are legitimately
doing their jobs. Litigants who are unhappy about the outcomes of
their cases sometimes decide that the best course of action is to try to
replace the judge. For example, the Campaign for California
Families, an anti-gay-marriage group, recently said "it would try to
recall a Sacramento judge who... upheld California's domestic-
partner laws, which gives same-sex couples a host of marriage-like
33. Since the only way a federal judge can take office is through
appointment, this discussion applies solely to state court judges in states that
hold judicial elections.
34. One could argue that Senate confirmation hearings for judicial
nominees have become analogous to elections in this respect, as a judge's past
decisions are likely to be closely scrutinized during the confirmation process.
See Stalled Bush Judicial Nominee Sent to Full Senate, at
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/7221797/ (Mar. 17, 2005) (discussing the nomination
of former Interior lawyer William Myers for the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, and stating that his "[o]pponents contend his past writings and
decisions suggest he would side with [anti-environmental] interests as a
judge"). This may not be an unfair scrutiny, however, it does give lower-level
judges at least some incentive to decide high profile cases according to opinion
polls instead of the facts.
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rights and obligations." 35 This judge simply upheld a statute based
on a defensible position. As a result, he may be required to raise
large sums of money to fight a recall and, if unsuccessful, will lose
his job. This situation demonstrates the danger that a judge may
decide a case "based upon political positions and not based upon the
facts, the law and the Constitution." 36 It can be difficult for a judge
to render an impartial decision when he or she has to wonder whether
a particular decision will subject the judge to a recall.
Persons unhappy with a judge's actions may also use the threat
of an election campaign to intimidate the judge. This occurred in the
2004 judicial elections in Los Angeles. As a result of a controversy
between the District Attorney's Office and judges at the Los Angeles
Superior Courthouse, the head of the Association of Deputy
District Attorneys led an effort to encourage people to run
against two judges in the upcoming judicial election. 3 Ads appeared
in local newspapers attacking the judges. 38 Although both judges
were ultimately reelected, both had to incur the costs and contend
with the trouble of the election process.
39
As another recent example, the Florida state court judge who
ordered Terry Schiavo's feeding tubes removed has not only been
targeted for impeachment,40 but he has also been excommunicated
from a church,4 and has had someone attempt to take a contract out
on his life.42 Talk about pressure to decide in a particular way!
These stories serve as a warning to judges that they might face a
35. Hudson Sangree, Judge Who Upheld Domestic-Partner Law Targeted,
DAILY JOURNAL, Sept. 10, 2004, at 2.
36. Public Statement, Cal. Judges Ass'n, CJA Board Position Regarding
Attacks Against Sacramento Superior Court Judge (Sept. 2004) (on file with
author).
37. Prosecutors Oppose Five Judges for Reelection, North County
Times, at http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2003/11/05/news/state/1 1_4 0320
05 29.txt (last modified Nov. 4, 2003); see also Endorsements, L.A. WEEKLY,
Feb. 27-Mar. 4, 2004, http://www.laweekly.com/ink/04/14/endorsements.php.
38. See sources cited supra note 37.
39. Independence Panel, supra note 12, at 3 1:00 (Taylor, J.).
40. See http://www.impeachjudgegreer.com/.
41. A Southern Baptist Church Excommunicates Judge, at http://
caldreaming.dailykos.com/story/2005/3/26/21622/0373 (Mar. 26, 2005).
42. Man Arrested in Alleged Schiavo Case Murder Plot, at http://
www.cnn.com/2005/US/03/25/arrest.schiavo/index.html (Mar. 25, 2005).
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recall, impeachment, or worse if they displease the wrong person or
group.
2. The Need to Raise Money
Judicial campaigns have been getting "noisier, nastier, and
costlier"43 in recent years. For example:
There was a 61 percent increase in total money raised by
state supreme court candidates since 1998, according to a
recent study.
According to "The New Politics of Judicial Elections," the
amount of money raised for supreme court candidates
doubled between 1994 and 2000.
In Alabama, candidates for the supreme court raised $13
million-an average of $1.2 million each. 4
These statistics make it clear that many judges must raise large
amounts of money to ensure a fair shot at retaining their seats on the
bench.
One "nastier" judicial election campaign commercial resorted to
showing miniaturized figures of the judges running for office,
dancing foolishly in horsehair wigs and robes in the pocket of an
insurance executive.45  Another commercial depicted the female
judge seeking reelection as a blindfolded figure holding the scales of
justice. In the commercial, she raises the blindfold to peek out at
insurance company contributors placing currency on the scales of
justice she is holding.46 This level of discourse cannot help but
intimidate its targets, in addition to compelling targets to raise money
to counter these attacks.
Putting judges in the position of having to raise substantial
amounts of money to finance election campaigns, and to withstand
humiliating commercial depictions of themselves, creates the risk of
bias in favor of contributors and against opposing parties. It also
43. See ABA Survey, supra note 1 (quoting Roy Schotland, Comment, 61
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 150 (1988)).
44. Id.
45. Markman, Taylor and Young (Michigan candidate television
commercial, 2000 election).
46. Resnick Is Justice for Sale (Ohio: Citizens for a Strong Ohio television
commercial, 2000 election).
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creates an appearance of impropriety because it is common sense that
contributors would not give money unless they reasonably believed
they could gain an advantage thereby. 4 7 What happens when a
contributor to a judge's campaign comes before that judge in court?
By contributing to a judge's campaign, persons and entities are
essentially "lobbying" the judiciary in a fashion similar to lobbying
the legislature. This lobbying brings with it the possibility that a
judge will decide a case based on who contributed to his or her last
campaign, rather than on the merits. Once again, the need to raise
money may reduce the judge's ability to render an impartial decision.
Furthermore, it subjects the judiciary to similar political pressures
felt by the legislature and executive, thereby hindering the judiciary's
ability to serve as an independent check on the power of those two
branches.
III. CONCLUSION
The mechanisms that have been fashioned to promote the
desirable end of judicial accountability have the undesired side effect
of making judges dependent. This dependence requires judges, and
even whole courts, to fashion alliances and to avoid antagonizing
various interest groups. Furthermore, making judges too accountable
for defensible decisions in their judicial capacity not only hinders
their ability to render impartial decisions, especially when the
outcome may be politically unpopular (think Brown v. Board of
Education), but it also raises issues concerning the checks and
balances inherent in our three-branch government. When
considering how much accountability to impose on the judiciary, we
need to decide whether we want politicians or independent thinkers
dispensing justice.
47. This "advantage" can manifest itself in one of two ways: (1) the
contributor hopes to influence a judge's decision-making in the future; or (2)
the contributor already knows a judge's tendencies and hopes to take
advantage by inserting the user-friendly judge into office.
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